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THE COURT OF APPEALS, 1953 TERM
of voters.54 In Matter of Aurelio,'5 the court took a definite stand
on the grounds that a, "strict observance of the letter of the stat-
ute would interfere unnecessarily with the intelligent and 'ready
expression of his choice by an independent voter."' 56
In the instant case, the court affirmed, per curiam, the order
of the Appellate Division which followed the Aurelio case and
held that a strict construction of the statute would be unconstitu-
tional and denied the application to change the format.
X. PROPEBTY
A. Real Property
Easements
Easements in public streets may be acquired in the following
ways: (1) By condemnation proceedings under a statute. (2) By
prescription, or where land is used by the public for twenty years
with the knowledge, but without the consent of the owner. (3) By
dedication through offer and implied acceptance, or when the owner
throws open his land intending to dedicate it for a highway and the
public uses it for such a length of time that they would be seriously
inconvenienced by an interruption of the enjoyment. (4) By dedi-
cation through offer and actual acceptance, where the owner
throws open his land and by acts or words invites acceptance of
the same for a highway, and the public authorities formally or in
terms accept it as a highway.'
In Sauchelli v. Fata,2 the owners of property abutting sides of
a blind alley sought to enjoin defendants whose property abutted
the dead end from using the land for ingress and egress. After
finding that the plaintiffs had easements of access in the property
the court granted the injunction on the grounds that defendants
failed to show acceptance by the town as a public highway and
since they had ready access to their land which faced another
54. Matter of Callaghan z. Voorhis, 252 N. Y. 14, 168 N. E. 447 (1929). The court
said that the statute prejudiced the independent body as they had nominated almost a
full row of candidates and a voter would think that no one had been nominated for
that office upon seeing the blank.
Matter of Crane v. Voorhis, 257 N.Y. 298, 178 N.E. 169 (1931). Here the
statute said in substance that if an independent body, who had not nominated candidates
for more than fifty percent of the offices to be filled, nominated a candidate who was
also a nominee of one of the other political partys, his name would only appear once
with both names and emblems. The court held this unconstitutional.
55. 291 N.Y. 176. 51 N.E. 2d 695 (1943).
56. Id. at 180, 51 N.E. 2d at 697.
1. Nicholas Copper Co. v. Contolly, 208 App. Div. 667, 203 N.Y. Supp. 839(2d Dep't 1924), af'd, 240 N. Y. 596 (1925).
2. 306 N.Y. 123, 116 N.E. 2d 75 (1953).
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street, there was no easement of necessity. The fact that plaintiffs
paid no taxes on the land although it was located on a tax map did
not evidence acceptance by public authorities.3
In Loch Sheldrake Associates v. Evans,4 the court divided
sharply over the interpretation of a reservation of water rights.
Through a remote common grantor the plaintiff owned a lake and
its shores subject to the reservation while the defendant owned a
mill lot- and the disputed reservation. The mill is no longer in
operation and the plaintiff sought to enjoin defendant from using
large quantities of water for her nearby hotel. In substance the
reservation contains the right to impound and draw water as well
as a right of ingress and egress to construct and maintain a dam
and any pipe lines existing or hereafter constructed. The use
of the water is limited by the natural high and low level water
marks.
The majority felt that the words of the deed were plain and
that there was no need to resort to additional circumstances. The
contention that defendant had only an easement appurtenant to
the mill lot was rejected because no reference was made to the
mill lot in the deed. While admitting that the phrase "easement
in gross" enjoyed popular usage, the court pointed out the tech-
nical impossibility of such a thing. The nature of an easement pre-
supposes two distinct tenements, one dominant and the other
servient5 The court concluded that the defendant had an absolute
interest in the nature of a right to take profits, citing Huntington
v. Asher8 and Saratoga State Waters Corp. v. Pratt.7  The ma-
jority would'have given defendant exclusive right to the water for
any purposes limited only by the natural water marks. However,
since only the plaintiff had appealed, the court could not broaden
the defendant's rights and therefore affirmed the Appellate Divi-
sion's decision' allowing defendant to use the water for any of
the purposes for which the grantor had used it, one of which was
supplying water for the hoteL
The dissent felt that a reference to pipe lines which were in ex-
istence made the deed ambiguous, and, as an ambiguous deed
should be interpreted in favor of the grantee,9 surrounding circum-
stances being considered,' 0 the defendant should have been allowed
3. See Johnson v. City of Niagara Falls. 230 N. Y. 77, 192 N. E. 213 (1920).
4. 306 N.Y. 297, 118 N.E. 2d 444 (1954).
5. Pierce v. Keaton, 70 N.Y. 419 (1877).
6. 96 N.Y. 604 (1884).
7. 227 N.Y. 429, 125 N.E. 834 (1920).
8. 280 App. Div. 51, 111 N.Y. S. 2d 365 (3d Dep't 1952).
9. Matter of City of New York, 209 N.Y. 344, 103 N.E. 484 (1913).
10. Wilson v. Ford, 209 N.Y. 186, 102 N.E. 614 (1913).
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to prove that an easement appurtenant to the mill lot had in fact
been contemplated. In that event the amount of water available
to defendant would be controlled by the quantity which the grantor
had used for the mill, the present use of water being irrelevant.11
. The dissenters, citing Flora v. Carbean2 and Matter of Find-lay1 3 further maintained that since both parties had agreed in the
lower courts that the right in question was an easement appir-
tenant to the mill lot, the Court of Appeals had no right to aban-
don that theory which would have produced a different result.
Restrictive Covenants
A restrictive covenant provided that land could not be used
for:
(1) A commercial garage, or automobile parking lot
(2) A public garage or public automobile filling station.
(5) Clubs, lodges, and social buildings in which dancing or
bowling may be an incidental use; . . .
A development association attempted to enjoin the owners of
a refreshment stand from using part of their land as parking area
for patrons.1 4
The court felt that the meaning of the restriction was clear
from the covenant itself. "Parking lot" considered in conjunc-
tion with commercial garage indicated that the land could not be
used for the business of storing automobiles for a stipulated price.
If a public parking lot were intended to be prohibited, it would
have been so stated in the restriction on public garages. The
court also rejected the contention that incidental parking was
restricted, because the covenant expressed clarity when incidental
use of the land was prohibited as in clause number five, supra.
The court did not rest solely on what appeared plain to them,
but recognized that the spirit of our law favors the free and un-
obstructed use of property, 5 and applied the rule that if a re-
strictive covenant is capable of more than one interpretation, it
will be construed against the party attempting to extend it.'6
11. Comstock v. Johnson, 46 N.Y. 615 (1871) ; 3 FARNHAM, WATERS AND WATER
RIGHTS 2286 (1904).
12. 38 N.Y. 111 (1868).
13. 253 N.Y. 1, 170 N.E. 471 (1930).
14. Premium Point Park Ass'n. v. Polar Bar, 306 N.Y. 507, 119 N.E. 2d 360
(1954). See Schoonmaker v. Hecksher, 171 App. Div. 148, 157 N.Y. Supp. 75 (1st
Dep't 1916), aff'd, 218 N. Y. 722, 113 N.E. 1066 (1916).
16. Ibid; See Buffalo Academy of the Sacred Heart v. Boehm, 267 N.Y. 242,
196 N.E. 42 (1935).
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